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Question 
What types of Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms in developing countries were 
introduced following a financial crisis, and what are the lessons learned from the reforms?  
Contents 
Summary 
1. Framing PFM interventions after financial crises 
2. PFM reforms after financial crises 
3. Other lessons learned 
Annex 1. PFM interventions and Covid-19 
Annex 2. Short-term fiscal responses to a financial crisis 
Annex 3. PFM reforms in resource-rich developing countries 
Annex 4. Indonesia case study 
References 
 
  
2 
Summary 
This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on what types of Public Finance Management (PFM) reforms in developing countries 
were introduced following a financial crisis. PFM frameworks and reforms often originated in 
circumstances of crisis. As Annex 1 shows, lessons from previous crises could give useful 
insight in how government financial management systems could be adapted in the context of the 
current Covid-19 crisis. This review does not suggest that fiscal responses and PFM 
reforms as mentioned in this report are all adequate measures for the Covid-19 crisis as 
the impact of PFM systems, strategies and reforms are very context specific. Annex 1 
gives some useful links to sources that relate to PFM responses during the Covid-19 crisis. 
The literature used in this review looks mostly back to the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-
1998), Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), and the commodity price crisis in 2014-2015 
affecting mainly resource-rich developing countries. As a result, the literature is often from 
around those periods and, therefore, not from the last five years as would be normally the case 
for K4D Helpdesk reports.  
The overall conclusion from this report is that PFM reforms indeed have played a 
significant role in setting up effective, efficient, and transparent fiscal stimulus packages 
(e.g. cash transfers, public work programmes) measures during and after a crisis. The 
review also shows that it is important to separate short-term PFM reforms or responses that 
allow adaptations of the fiscal framework to let fiscal responses (e.g. stimulus packages) happen 
during a crisis, and longer-term PFM reforms after a crisis that prevent and better equip 
governments for a potential financial crisis. The focus areas of PFM reforms are mainly risk 
management (e.g. through control of the fiscal balance and aggregate spending), allocative 
efficiency (e.g. through prioritisation of expenditure), effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure 
(e.g. through value-for-money measures), and financial management transparency (e.g. through 
web-based systems and awareness programmes). 
This review uses the same structure to explain the types of PFM reforms and lessons learned 
from them as mentioned in Wendling et al. (2020), separating reforms in the design, 
implementation, and oversight phases of the PFM cycle. By doing this, this rapid literature review 
makes the following points: 
PFM reforms and lessons in the design phase: 
 Parliamentary scrutiny and securing legal authorisation of policy measures are 
necessary, according to each country’s institutional framework – in most cases through a 
Supplementary Budget.  
 In countries where existing social protection programmes are weak, the crisis may 
provide an opportunity to strengthen them, through both expanding coverage and 
increasing benefits. The design of the programmes can be gradually refined over time.  
 A large shock may also expose weaknesses in the design of the fiscal rules, which 
generate fiscal stability and increase the ability to adequately respond to crisis. However, 
fiscal rules must be sufficiently flexible to manage unexpected economic or other large 
shocks.  
 Escape clauses in fiscal rules are only useful as they are accompanied by clear 
guidelines (how and when to use them), including an effective control mechanism. 
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 Spending needs are best prioritised in a transparent, but quick way by preparing 
estimates of additional resource requirements.  
 Even under strong time pressure, there should be consulting with stakeholders, both to 
improve the design of the support package and to help build support amongst economic 
actors.  
PFM reforms and lessons in the implementation phase: 
 Crisis-related budget and spending measures should be presented with specific crisis-
related measures in the budget with clear performance indicators to facilitate the ex-post 
assessment of impact.   
 Additional crisis-related spending should be tracked, ideally through dedicated 
programmes or sections of the budget. Good recording will make it easier to cease 
temporary spending arrangements once the need is over.  
 Often a stream for handling priority items and fast track expenditure authorisations for the 
most prioritised measures is created.  
 Adopting a risk-based approach to controls is often recommended. For example, pre-
audit can focus only on high-risk payments, while relatively less risky payments may be 
subjected to post-audit. 
 The biggest challenge will likely be the beneficiary authentication, fraud prevention, and 
corruption within the PFM system, in particular, as quick responses are needed.  
 Coordination with subnational governments/entities are important in understanding the 
needs at the grassroot level.  
 Risk management mechanisms should be in place to control and monitor risk exposure.   
PFM reforms and lessons in the oversight phase: 
 Monitoring and accountability system should be independent and transparent focusing on 
both complying to fiscal rules, advising on any changes in such rules, and evaluating 
impact and quality of public investments.  
 However, most governments in developing countries have not established an external 
oversight body tasked with monitoring compliance with their fiscal rules. In the cases 
where there is limited technical capacity but already one established institution working 
on public finance, it may be beneficial to build on it and expand its remit, rather than 
setting up a new institution. 
 Many fiscal councils must, as part of their mandates, check compliance with fiscal rules, 
although they cannot prevent governments from actually breaking these rules.  
 Countries with national independent oversight bodies are more likely to follow fiscal rules 
than countries with no formal oversight. But fiscal councils require capacity and strong 
governance structures, which may be difficult to establish, especially in low-income 
countries. 
Some more general lessons mentioned in the literature, are:  
 It is difficult for fiscal stimulus to be effectively implemented in timely, targeted, and 
temporary manner often because of the political process that precedes the delivery of the 
stimulus. Such fact points to the need for enhancing the scope and effectiveness of 
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automatic stabilisers, the fiscal policy tools that respond immediately and symmetrically 
to business cycle fluctuations (ILO et al. 2011).  
 Even in the most favourable of circumstances, the scale and complexity of the tasks to 
be undertaken are enormous, requiring levels of coordination and collaboration that may 
be without precedent for those involved. As such the pace and coherence of PFM 
reforms is important. Reforms are to be undertaken incrementally, allowing for adaptation 
and experimentation, in particular when PFM reforms are combined with decentralisation 
processes (Woolcock et al., 2018).  
 Because many low-income countries have no robust PFM system in place, they could 
follow a policy guideline (instead of fully implementing a fiscal policy framework) to 
enhance fiscal discipline without formally committing to a specific fiscal framework until it 
has gone through a learning process and has established a better PFM system (Sharma 
& Strauss, 2013). 
 Needs to achieve goals of reforms are mainly concentrated on technical assistance, legal 
frameworks, and capacity building of employees. As such most emphasis in reforms is on 
building internal transparency, control, and capacity systems. However, there is less 
focus on strong public pressure for change (Grant Thornton, 2013).  
Finally, this report includes several Annexes that explain in more details 1) what specific fiscal 
responses governments in developing countries have used in the aftermath of a crisis (Annex 2), 
2) how in particular resource-rich developing countries deal in PFM systems to tackle procyclical 
budgeting (Annex 3), and 3) a specific case study on Indonesia as a country that initially 
struggled but in the end successfully established PFM reforms after the Asian Financial Crisis 
and partly due to these reforms could respond well to the Global Financial Crisis. 
1. Framing PFM interventions after financial crises 
Public Finance Management (PFM) is the processes through which public funds are 
managed. Piatti-Fünfkirchen and Schneider (2018) mention the three overarching objectives of 
PFM as: aggregate fiscal discipline, operational (or technical) efficiency, and allocative efficiency. 
Although PFM systems and strategies are adapted over time, a financial crisis and its aftermath 
change radically the landscape of government budgeting. Fiscal circumstances (revenues and 
expenditures) deteriorate significantly after a financial crisis, forcing a rethinking of the 
main directions of PFM systems, strategies and reforms (OECD, 2015). Countries that face 
a financial crisis need costly emergency stimulus packages to rescue the economy and welfare 
of citizens (see Annex 2). Hence, governments have to take into account the long-term element 
of expenditure pressure as they can expect potentially large future increases in interest 
expenditure due to interest-rate increases on rapidly increasing levels of government debt.  
The other problem governments face after a financial crisis is slow revenue growth. In 
emerging economies, low-income countries (LICs), and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), 
the tax base is already low due to trade liberalisation and tax competition. The result is that 
governments in LICs and LMICs are more dependent for revenues on corporate taxes from a 
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small number of large firms.1 Particularly resource-rich countries show high volatility on their 
corporate tax revenues, making them extra vulnerable for low commodity prices which occur 
during and in the aftermath of financial crises (see more in Annex 3). Slow revenue growth 
makes it not only harder to control deficits in the short run, but also makes it much more 
difficult to reduce the effective debt burden in the long-term. 
Financial crises impact on countries differently due to the specifics of the financial crisis itself, but 
also due to countries’ specific financial and economic (e.g. debt, exchange rate, export base) 
positions antes-crisis. Governance specifics and political economy are also important 
because quick, adequate, effective, transparent and decisive government responses and 
control mechanisms are needed to tackle financial crises and their economic downturn 
(Hill, 2012; Fritz et al., 2017). This is where PFM has a role to play, in shaping a country’s fiscal 
framework and decision-making processes within the budgetary cycle. This cycle, also called 
PFM cycle, contains different phases:2 
 It starts with the budget planning phase, which is a strategic phase with internal control 
mechanisms within government to come to a budget decision.  
 The next phase is budget preparation and legislation, in which Parliaments have an 
important internal control function. 
 This is followed by the budget execution that involves managerial activities within the 
public services, with internal control and audit mechanisms in government institutions.  
 The fourth phase involves accounting and reporting about implementation and 
progress. 
 This is followed by the external control and audit phase.  
 The cycle ends with a legislative oversight that should lead to a new cycle of planning a 
new budget within the fiscal framework.    
This report identifies what PFM reforms (short-term and long-term) emerging economies and 
developing countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (to some extent in Latin America) have 
installed after they faced a financial crisis or severe economic downturns. It is important to 
separate short-term PFM reforms or responses that allow adaptations of the fiscal 
framework to let fiscal responses (e.g. stimulus packages) happen during a crisis, and 
longer-term PFM reforms after a crisis that prevent and better equip governments for a 
potential new financial crisis.3  
Spilimbargo et al. (2008) make the point that the optimal fiscal package should be timely, 
large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective, and sustainable to have any effect after a 
major financial crisis. The explanation is that the need for action is immediate, the expected 
decrease in private demand exceptionally large, that the downturn last for some time with a 
unusual degree of uncertainty associated with any single measure, which requires a collective 
                                                   
1 See for example: Quak, E. (2018) The Impact of International Tax Competition on Low and Middle-Income Countries. K4D 
Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. https://www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/the-impact-of-
international-tax-competition-on-low-and-middle-income-countries 
2 See for example https://gsdrc.org/professional-dev/public-financial-management/ and https://www.cabri-
sbo.org/uploads/files/Documents/Cabri_Module-1-ENG.pdf 
3 Author’s own observation from the literature. 
6 
commitment, although it should not lead to a debt explosion and adverse reactions of financial 
markets (Spilimbargo et al., 2008). In this complex web with often opposed stakes at play PFM 
reforms take shape.  
For any fiscal stimulus, short-term PFM interventions are needed to improve the decision-
making processes, flexibility in implementation measures, and efficiency of monitoring 
during a crisis. On the other hand, PFM reforms after a financial crisis can also be longer-term 
interventions, whose focus and goal is often less clear to peg them back to the financial crisis 
and therefore relate to much more issues than emergency fiscal responses. Although this 
distinction is clear for the timeframe and goals, both focus on the same PFM issues. PFM 
reforms that occur after a financial crisis relate to (e.g. OECD, 2015; Grant Thornton, 2013): 
 Risk management (e.g. through control of the fiscal balance and aggregate spending).  
 Allocative efficiency (e.g. through prioritisation of expenditure).  
 Effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure (e.g. through value-for-money measures). 
 Financial management transparency (e.g. through web-based systems and awareness 
programmes). 
Grant Thornton (2013) did a worldwide survey amongst government representatives in 
developing countries (although not exclusively) regarding PFM reforms after the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) in 2008. The GFC provided many countries with an impetus to improve PFM 
practices. Even in the very small number of countries where respondents reported that the crisis 
had a minimal impact and did not require policy changes, the GFC provided support for the 
government to improve service delivery effectiveness and efficiency.  
The report indeed shows that many countries established PFM reforms around the above-
mentioned areas. For example, countries established processes to recognise fiscal risks as a 
result of the GFC. However, fewer countries stated PFM reforms to improve methods for better 
understanding future costs of current policies (e.g. impact assessments or scenario analyses 
for preparing budgets and forecasting costs in medium- and long-term strategic plan 
development). An area that has improved particularly after the GFC regarding risk management 
are independent internal control and audit measures.  
Through expenditure prioritisation, important benefit programmes and obligations to health 
care services, for example, could be spared or less damaged by stricter fiscal balance rules.  
Furthermore, allocation of budgets to government agencies have been targeted much more to 
their specific needs, which are measured according to the accomplishments of their major 
final outputs. The Grant Thornton (2013) report also refers to PFM reforms to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of expenditures through Public Expenditure Tracking (PET) 
surveys, performance-based incentives, and clear indicators to measure outcomes. 
2. PFM reforms after financial crises 
Annex 2 shows that as a percentage of 2008 GDP countries in Asia and the Pacific spent 
the most on fiscal stimulus packages as a response to the GFC. Africa and the Middle 
East are second. Asia and the Pacific (not including Japan and Korea) spent 9.1% of its 2008 
GDP on stimulus efforts (weighted average by country size) (ILO et al., 2011). More importantly, 
the studies by Khatiwada (2009) and ILO et al. (2011) particularly show a clear distinction 
between developed and developing countries. Advanced economies focussed mostly on tax 
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cuts while developing and emerging economies focussed on infrastructure spending. It is 
important to note that PFM systems, strategies and reforms are at the heart of the decisions that 
have shaped such fiscal responses.  
Short-term and longer-term PFM reforms often occur in the aftermath of a financial crisis or 
severe economic downturn, because a crisis generates conditions to test PFM systems and 
frameworks thoroughly in decision-making (design), implementation, and oversight. 
Emergencies also generate insight into how transparent the PFM system is – since crises 
offer a “fertile ground for vested interests to use public funds for private gain, making it 
critical that vulnerabilities to corruption and misuse be recognised and mitigated” 
(Wendling, 2020, p.3).  
Wendling et al. (2020) provide the 2015 example of the Sierra Leone Auditor General audit of 
domestic donations that the government made for the Ebola relief effort. The audit provides 
evidence of mismanagement by public officials in the distribution of these funds. Payments for 
supplies and sensitisation efforts were duplicated and undocumented, money was paid out to 
private individuals rather than to organisations and procurement procedures were widely 
disregarded. Audits of international development organisation spending showed there was also a 
failure to provide rightful healthcare workers’ salaries and bonuses which were paid out to 
private individuals by those charged with distribution (Wendling et al., 2020). 
By following the PFM cycle, this review will highlight different PFM reforms in the design, 
implementation and oversight phases after a financial crisis. In emerging economies and 
developing countries, these measures are often taken in cooperation with the IMF and other 
international donors in combination with technical assistance and capacity building. However, 
‘best practice’ in one country is not per se the answer for another country, even in the 
same region. Country-specific PFM needs, institutional capacity (consultation, decision-making, 
implementation, monitoring), and extent of exposure to external shocks are important factors that 
create different environments that put fiscal frameworks (e.g. different set of fiscal rules and 
funds) in place that ultimately impact on country-specific PFM interventions after a crisis.  
Because of the very specific needs per country this part has a more generally approach on PFM 
reforms after a financial crisis or severe economic downturn, mainly based on some recently 
published IMF sources on experiences of PFM responses after an emergency or crisis. 
PFM reforms and lessons in the design phase 
The key challenge is to balance the urgency and timeliness of the response in a volatile 
economic environment with achieving transparency in the identification and presentation of the 
response measures (Wendling et al., 2020). Parliamentary scrutiny and securing legal 
authorisation of policy measures are necessary, according to each country’s institutional 
framework – in most cases through a Supplementary Budget. However, as Box 1 shows 
earmarking specific spending in budgets for a longer period is not always efficient.  
Countries should prioritise measures that are consistent with their medium-term 
development needs (Shang et al., 2020). In countries where existing social protection 
programmes are weak, the crisis may provide an opportunity to strengthen them, through both 
expanding coverage and increasing benefits. Furthermore, the design of these programmes 
can be gradually refined over time. For example, “where a universal cash transfer programme 
is introduced, its coverage of the hard-to-reach segments of the population may be further 
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improved, and targeting may be introduced directly for these programmes or through the tax 
system” (Shang et al., 2020, p.2).  
A large shock may also expose weaknesses in the design of the fiscal rules, which 
generate fiscal stability and increase the ability to adequately respond to crisis (Mihalyi & 
Fernández, 2018). The IMF (Schaechter et al, 2012) classifies fiscal rules in four categories, 
however, in practice, governments often use some combination of these rules (i.e. debt rules, 
budget balance rules, expenditure rules, and revenue rules).4 It is important to note that the 
literature on fiscal rules is clear; fiscal rules must be sufficiently flexible to manage 
unexpected economic or other large shocks (Eyraud et al., 2018; Mihalyi & Fernández, 
2018), even require escape clauses to allow temporary deviations from the rules (Gbohoui & 
Medas, 2020). The use of escape clauses “should involve a well specified and transparent 
process to preserve the credibility of the framework”, write Gbohoui and Medas (2020, p.1). In 
addition, faced with a crisis some countries either do not have escape clauses and may need to 
consider suspending their rules without a well-defined process or even abandoning or revising 
the rules. 
The collapse in commodity prices in 2014 and 2015 prompted many commodity exporters to 
revise or recalibrate their fiscal rules. The GFC also has put many fiscal rules to tests, 
prompting a raft of reforms to rules including the introduction of new rules, revamping of 
escape clauses, and enhancement of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. As a 
result, several countries have introduced escape clauses in their fiscal rule frameworks after the 
GFC. Gbohoui and Medas (2020) show that cross-country experiences suggest that a well-
defined escape clause should specify:  
 a limited and clearly defined set of events triggering the operation of the clause,  
 the authority to activate it,  
 the timeline and procedures to revert to the rule,  
 an effective control mechanism, and  
 a good communication strategy. 
                                                   
4 Debt rules set an explicit limit or target for public debt in percent of GDP. However, debts are mostly affected by changes in 
interest or exchange rate and less by budgetary measures. These rules limit countries from borrowing in downtime periods but 
do not often prevent resource-rich countries’ governments from high debts in boom periods (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.10). 
Budget balance rules constrain the variable that primarily influences the debt ratio and are largely under the control of policy 
makers. However, budget balance rules are procyclical because they allow expenditures to increase with rising revenue, and if 
binding, they force expenditure cuts when revenues are declining. As such, these rules transmit the volatility of resource 
revenue into fiscal policy in resource-rich countries and do not provide flexibility in adjusting to larger commodity price drops 
(Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.9). Some countries have non-resource current balance rules to avoid procyclical budgeting, 
however, these countries might create parallel budgets for current and capital spending (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). 
Expenditure rules set limits on total, primary, or current spending. However, governments can circumvent rules by engaging in 
off budget spending and not providing flexibility to respond counter-cyclically to commodity price shocks. Furthermore, 
governments may try to comply with an expenditure rule by cutting productive spending too much compared with non-
productive spending. Countries with new resource discoveries but limited spending capacity may consider using expenditure 
rules to surmount pressures to spend based on expectations of future wealth (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.11). Revenue 
rules set ceilings or floors on revenues and are aimed at boosting revenue collection and/or preventing an excessive tax 
burden. Many resource-rich countries have set up regulations to limit how much resource revenue should enter the budget and 
how much they should deposit into a sovereign wealth fund (see section 3). However, these rules only constrain government 
finances if complemented by other rules that limit borrowing or debt. Otherwise, governments can save a portion of revenues, 
while borrowing at the same time and fail to achieve their objectives (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018, p.11). See for a far more 
detailed list of fiscal rules Ossowski & Halland (2016) p.60-62. 
9 
As further explained in Annex 3, the Peru case is interesting because the country invoked a 
well-defined escape clause since 2013 rather than modify or break its fiscal rule. Although 
many countries have an escape clause for their fiscal rules, only Peru has specific operational 
guidance on how to activate the escape clause in event of a natural disaster or international 
crisis (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). Peru also has a build-in monitoring and internal and 
external control system. For example, in Peru, the fiscal council supported the decision to 
suspend the rule in 2020-21, due to the Covid-19 crisis, but recommended the publication of 
reports assessing the exceptional measures being adopted and explain the target for the deficit 
in 2021 to ensure transparency and accountability (Gbohoui & Medas, 2020). 
However, the Peru case is an exception as most escape clauses in fiscal rules are less well 
designed and controlled, making them vulnerable for political interests. Furthermore, 
frequent revisions may signal weak government commitment to fiscal discipline and have 
adverse market reactions (higher borrowing costs). In general, rules should not be revised 
unless there are large and persistent deviations from “first-best” policies (Eyraud et al. 
2018). 
On another note, crisis-related budget and spending measures should be presented with 
specific crisis-related measures in the budget with clear eligibility criteria and ensuring 
granularity of information and performance indicators to facilitate the ex-post assessment 
of impact (Wendling et al., 2020). Spending needs to be prioritised in a transparent, but quick 
way. Countries often prepare quick estimates of additional resource requirements, take extra 
care that high priority expenditures including the support to vulnerable people and sectors are not 
adversely impacted, and line ministries are asked by the Ministry of Finance to provide savings in 
their respective budgets on a consideration of these policy priorities and progress (Wendling et 
al., 2020). Furthermore, medium-term budget frameworks could be adapted due to the 
impact of reprioritisations and higher debts.  
Even under strong time pressure, there should be consulting with stakeholders, both to 
improve the design of the support package and to help build support amongst economic 
actors. Expert and independent civil society organisations (CSOs) can provide inputs to improve 
the design of fiscal measures or help target it to specific, at-risk constituencies. For example, in 
the case of the current Covid-19 crisis, Côte d’Ivoire, before announcing its pandemic policy 
response at the end of March 2020, it had held consultations at the level of the Minister of 
Finance with banks and employers’ unions (Wendling et al., 2020). Also, in Mexico, CIEP (Centro 
de Investigacion Economica y Presupuestaria, Center for Economic and Fiscal Studies) 
produced proposals on various policy alternatives to reallocate budget resources and provide 
economic support in the present crisis (Wendling et al. 2020).  
PFM reforms and lessons in implementation phase 
The key challenge in this phase of the PFM cycle is to have adequate control and 
tracking/traceability of budget and off-budget interventions, to ensure that the agreed 
emergency measures are deployed effectively and in line with their intended purpose and – if 
needed – allow revising and adapting the set of measures to changing circumstances (Wendling 
et al. 2020).  
Saxena and Stone (2020) show that additional crisis-related spending should be tracked, 
ideally through dedicated programmes or sections of the budget. They also show that it is 
important to be transparent in applying off-budget measures such as guarantees, which 
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constitute a significant part of support packages in crisis. Good recording will make it easier to 
cease temporary spending arrangements once the need is over. Feedback loops are 
important for timely information delivery to policymakers. As the Grant Thornton survey (2013) 
shows, respondents indicated that the most common method to measure the effectiveness and 
efficiency of service delivery in PFM practices after the GFC appears to be through incorporating 
performance management into the budget process, however, challenges still occur, 
particularly in implementing a performance measurement system. 
When rapid implementation of the policy response requires adapting existing rules to provide 
more flexibility, this has to be done in a transparent manner via Financial Management 
Information Systems (FMIS). Saxena and Stone (2020, p.3) do not suggest to bypass 
established controls but “create a stream for handling priority items and fast track 
expenditure authorisations for the most prioritised measures. There could always be 
tension between controls and efficiency, and a balanced approach should be taken”. Saxena and 
Stone (2020) mention several ways countries can do this, based on IMF experiences from PFM 
responses after a crisis: 
 Adopt a risk-based approach to controls. For example, pre-audit can focus only on 
high-risk payments, while relatively less risky payments may be subjected to post-audit. 
 Where feasible, give greater delegation of financial authority — both for reallocation 
of funds and payment approvals — to frontline ministries, such as the health ministry. 
 Where possible, use of a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system would enable 
moving funds swiftly across the country’s financial system. Such systems may be 
designed primarily for high-value transactions between financial institutions. 
 Direct deposits through banking channels or mobile payments and prepaid cards 
for those without a bank account works the best for wage subsidies and cash transfers to 
large sections of affected population. These methods require advance preparation and 
cannot be used on-the-fly. Early action from the authorities—especially at the local 
level—will be critical for ensuring the efficacy of such mass disbursement systems. 
 The biggest challenge will likely be the beneficiary authentication and fraud 
prevention. Governments will have to devise ways of ensuring timely relief disbursement 
with an acceptable degree of risk. 
 Some governments may resort to cash advances to make available resources to 
service delivery units promptly, especially if the normal disbursement procedures 
are cumbersome and take time. It will be important to track and account for advances 
properly and ensure their utilisation and prompt settlement.  
 Coordination with subnational governments/entities will be important in 
understanding the needs at the grassroot level, to provide the necessary funding to 
enable them to meet the enhanced service delivery requirements, and to improve the 
quality of response. A system of information exchange on funding needs of subnational 
governments, their liquidity position and implementation progress is necessary to for 
timely and accurate programme executions. 
Although some risk management in the implementation phase could be relaxed for some 
less risky spending, mechanisms should be in place to control and monitor risk exposure. 
Balibek et al. (2020) highlights the importance of an internal monitoring mechanism for regular 
review of: (i) the potential for risk realisation as new information becomes available; (ii) whether 
existing policies remain appropriate; and (iii) whether existing mitigation measures are adequate. 
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Furthermore, Balibek et al. (2020) mention the importance of Parliamentary involvement in 
monitoring the guarantees given.  
PFM reforms and lessons in the oversight phase 
The challenge here is to ensure comprehensive and transparent reporting and public 
accountability procedures that existing oversight institutions (e.g. Parliament, the Supreme Audit 
Institution, independent fiscal councils), civil society, and the public at large are able to enforce 
while the new support measures are being designed and implemented (Wendling et al., 2020). 
Monitoring and accountability system should be independent and transparent focusing on 
both complying to fiscal rules, advising on any changes in such rules, and evaluating 
impact and quality of public investments. This means regularly reporting on the progress in 
the implementation of the support package – both on and off-budget operations – and a focus on 
accessibility of information for the average citizen. Inclusion of civil society important, for 
example, ICEFI in Guatemala is monitoring the implementation of emergency measures and 
alerting government authorities to speed up administrative procedures for successful 
implementation (Wendling et al., 2020). 
However, most governments in developing countries have not established an external oversight 
body tasked with monitoring compliance with their fiscal rules. The aims, mandates and 
limitations of these institutions vary depending on the legal, political and institutional environment 
of each country. The most common institutions are: 
 Supreme audit institutions increasingly play a role in overseeing the fiscal framework, 
but only when fiscal rules are widely adopted (e.g. Brazil, India, Indonesia). They can 
play an important role in resource governance as they oversee compliance with rules 
across the whole extractive decision chain. They are well placed to monitor whether the 
law was followed and if budgetary and fiscal targets have been met. However, audits are 
protracted in time, often completed more than a year after budget execution, which 
hinders their ability to warn about impending risks (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018).5 
 Many fiscal councils were established after the GFC in 2008. Unlike audit institutions, 
fiscal councils generally conduct ex-ante evaluations of compliance with the rule through 
forecasts and provide inputs into the planning and policy formulation process (e.g., by 
estimating costs of measures), often making explicit recommendations on fiscal 
sustainability. Unfortunately, the technical expertise needed for a well-functioning fiscal 
council remains a challenge across low-income countries (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). 
 A parliamentary budget office’s role is to provide technical support to parliamentarians 
in their legislative and oversight functions. They often do this by supporting the work of 
                                                   
5 The Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts, the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), conducts inspections and audits on its own 
initiatives or by request of the National Congress. The house of representatives elects the audit board of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK). The BPK provides periodic reports on state finance accountability, including 
periodic reports on fiscal compliance. It is established in the constitution and is independent from both the legislative and 
executive branches of government. In India, however, the president elects the comptroller and auditor-general members. The 
Indian audit institution’s mandate is vague in respect of fiscal rules oversight, but it does report on compliance regularly (Mihalyi 
& Fernández, 2018). 
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the main budget committees, or evaluating or costing various new bills. Some also review 
compliance with fiscal rules.6 
In the cases where there is limited technical capacity but already one established 
institution working on public finance, it may be beneficial to build on it and expand its 
remit, rather than setting up a new institution (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). Most common in 
developing countries is to establish a fiscal advisory council. For example, in Timor-Leste, 
Nigeria, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Indonesia and Ghana independent fiscal advisory councils have 
been created to advise (non-binding recommendations) governments and legislators in the 
management of their resource wealth and related fiscal policy formulation and implementation. 
To cite Sharma and Strauss (2013, p.15): “Opening up fiscal policy to scrutiny by an independent 
body is a good practice of fiscal transparency, which puts pressure on the government to be 
honest. Enshrining independence in legislation is considered an effective means of 
demonstrating political support for a fiscal council”.  
Typically, fiscal councils are government or legislative agencies mandated to provide 
independent advice on and/or verify fiscal policies, plans and performance (Hemming, 
2013; Hemming & Joyce, 2013). Many fiscal councils must, as part of their mandates, check 
compliance with fiscal rules, although they cannot prevent governments from actually breaking 
these rules. However, the literature also mentions that too much pressure from fiscal councils on 
governments could undermine the credibility of the government and draining scarce resources 
from the government (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). While the mandate of fiscal councils differs 
among countries, no council has been granted the power to set fiscal targets or change taxes, as 
this would raise serious issues of democratic accountability (Ossowski & Halland, 2016).  
Empirical evidence on the usefulness of fiscal councils in developing countries is still sparse 
(Hemming, 2013). However, Mihalyi and Fernández (2018) research shows overall countries 
with national independent oversight bodies are more likely to follow fiscal rules than 
countries with no formal oversight. Colombia, Indonesia (Annex 4 shows how this PFM 
reforms can be directly related to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98) and Peru are all 
examples of countries with strong oversight bodies publishing yearly reports on fiscal rule 
compliance. But fiscal councils require capacity and strong governance structures, which may be 
difficult to establish, especially in low-income countries (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). 
Box 1. Earmarking  
Some countries have utilised strict earmarking practices to channel revenues to particular budget items. This 
often happens in resource-rich developing countries, and/or often in the aftermath of a crisis to secure specific 
spending in a constrained budget. However, evidence from research shows that long-term “earmarking 
generally reduces fiscal flexibility and is open to capture from special interests, leading to 
underinvestment or overinvestment” (OECD, 2018, p.19). The OECD (2018) report mentions several 
disadvantages to earmarking: 
 It can constrain budgetary flexibility.  
 It may lead to government inefficiency, and overinvestment or underinvestment in certain public services.  
 It may contribute to procyclicality of public expenditure.  
                                                   
6 The Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Publicas (CEFP) in Mexico is an examples of parliamentary budget offices. It is not 
legally mandated to monitor compliance with the fiscal rules. Nevertheless, CEFP started publishing quarterly public finance 
reports in 2016, which can be used to monitor the rules.  
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 It can be fashioned such that it is not subject to parliamentary oversight. This may undermine public financial 
management and public investment.  
Ecuador in the start of the 2000s is mentioned as example how earmarking can go wrong (e.g. OECD, 
2018; Ossowski & Halland, 2016). Although the government had in place fiscal rules and a stabilisation fund, on 
the other hand the budget process in Ecuador had been characterised by multiple competing interest groups, 
institutional instability, and limited incentives for long-term cooperation (Cueva & Ortiz, 2013). The complexity of 
the earmarking, and when and how deposits were made, constrained government’s ability to prioritise spending 
efficiently. As such earmarking exacerbated spending pressures during the 2003-2008 oil boom (Lopez-Murphy 
et al., 2010). In 2008 the whole fiscal system was dismantled as it became clear that the schemes favoured debt 
repayment rather than social spending (Arrellano-Yanguas & Mejía Acosta, 2014). 
On the other hand, Botswana and Indonesia are mentioned as countries that to some extent earmarked 
resource revenues, but without relying on strict and complex statutory expenditure requirements. Both 
countries ‘earmarking’ has been linked to a clear governmental development policy agenda approved by 
parliament. Both countries successfully combined sound macroeconomic management with clear long-term 
development policies, which was the basis for increased productive investments in human capital and 
infrastructure. Development spending was stable over a long period as the stabilisation fund ensured continued 
spending in downturn periods (OECD, 2018).   
3. Other lessons learned 
Some general lessons on PFM interventions and reforms after a financial crisis mentioned in the 
literature, are: 
 While the debate about which specific risk management techniques are best suited 
to the public sector continues, there is general agreement that governments need 
to better understand the financial impacts of current policies and future 
unexpected events. For the South-East Asian countries with some risk management 
measures in place due to reforms after the Asian Financial Crisis, this helped them 
during the GFC to act adequately and within their own terms without being too dependent 
on others (Sangsubhan, K. & Basri, C.M., 2012). 
 A lesson mentioned in Grant Thornton (2013) and drawn from the GFC is that many 
governments did not sufficiently employ risk management into their PFM 
practices. As a result, they were forced public assumption of previously private 
indebtedness, and dramatically impacted revenues and trade flows. As these lessons 
have become clearer, discussions on risk management techniques relevant to the public 
sector have become part of the PFM debate. 
 The AFC showed the importance of expansionary fiscal responses in the short-
term, to mitigate the immediate threats. This was tested again during the GFC in 
which most developing countries were able to turn the tide supported with some 
stimulus packages combined with PFM reforms. The AFC also showed that the initial 
reform packages focussed too much on structural reforms while these could be better 
dealt with in the medium-term to give priority to short-term crisis management to support 
actions to protect the most vulnerable with food supplies with direct transfers and 
subsidies, generating income through cash transfers and public works, while giving 
business temporary tax cuts (e.g. Doraisami, 2011; Sangsubhan, K. & Basri, C.M. 2012; 
Ariadharma, E. & Purnomo, H., 2018).  
 ILO et al. (2011) show clearly that it is difficult for fiscal stimulus to be effectively 
implemented in timely, targeted, and temporary manner because of the political 
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process that precedes the delivery of the stimulus. Such fact points to the need for 
enhancing the scope and effectiveness of automatic stabilisers, the fiscal policy 
tools that respond immediately and symmetrically to business cycle fluctuations. 
“Automatic stabilisers have a natural advantage over discretionary policy not only 
because they are automatically implemented and withdrawn but also because the public 
debt automatically remains stable over the business cycle. However, placing the right 
automatic stabilisers in the economy in advance to economic shocks is another policy 
challenge that countries need to ponder upon, particularly in consideration of their 
associated costs”, state ILO et al., (2011, p.6). While automatic stabilisers have an 
important place in combating economic fluctuations, it is often difficult to optimise these 
tools and place them in advance. 
 Even in the most favourable of circumstances, the scale and complexity of the 
tasks to be undertaken are enormous, requiring levels of coordination and 
collaboration that may be without precedent for those involved (Woolcock et al., 
2018). Entirely new skills—for example, learning to use sophisticated software—may 
need to be acquired by tens of thousands of people. “Such reforms are often premised 
on the need to “modernise” prevailing administrative systems, with the long-run payoff 
being enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in the collection, management and 
allocation of public resources, all in pursuit of top-priority national strategy objectives”, 
state Woolcock et al. (2018, p.1).  
 These payoffs may take many years to fully materialise, requiring sustained 
commitments from senior officials as set-backs, delays and confusion threaten to 
sap morale and momentum (Woolcock et al.,, 2018). High turn-over, competing 
distractions and inherent uncertainty can compromise the necessary focus. As such the 
pace and coherence of PFM reforms is important where reforms are to be undertaken 
incrementally. Adaptation, allowing some form of experimentation within pilots for 
innovative measures, and an incremental, gradual approach is often the best way 
forward in emerging economies and developing countries, in particular when PFM 
reforms are combined with decentralisation processes. “Even where the political context 
for reform is very supportive, care needs to be taken in designing the technical aspects of 
the programme to ensure that reforms do not become the unmanageable victim of their 
own momentum”, state Woolcock et al. (2018, p.9). 
 Fiscal rules can only be effective if accompanied with procedural rules to avoid too 
much ‘creative accounting’. Researchers refer not only to ‘numerical fiscal rules’ but 
insist to combine them with ‘procedural fiscal rules’ that “stipulate the principles and 
associated practices of transparency and accountability that should guide the design and 
implementation of fiscal policy” (Sharma & Strauss, 2013, p.9-10). Typical procedural 
rules include: a ‘hierarchical’ budget formulation process, for example, where more power 
is given to the Ministry of Finance than to the line ministries; transparency requirements 
in the budget document; and distinct amendment rules for budget formulation and 
approval (Sharma & Strauss, 2013).  
 Because many low-income countries have no robust PFM and PIM systems in 
place, they could follow a policy guideline (instead of fully implementing a fiscal 
policy framework) to enhance fiscal discipline without formally committing to a 
specific fiscal framework until it has gone through a learning process and has 
established better PFM and PIM systems (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). 
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 Other lessons for longer term PFM reforms are to learn about what works through 
an iterative process. However, there is a risk that if a rule or commitment is broken the 
government could lose credibility. Furthermore, choose a simple framework that is 
easily understood and straightforward to monitor. This approach is generally 
preferable to a complicated structure that is less transparent (Mihalyi and Fernández, 
2018).  
 Needs to achieve goals of reforms are mainly concentrated on technical 
assistance, legal frameworks, and capacity building of employees. As such most 
emphasis in reforms is on building internal transparency, control, and capacity 
systems. However, there is less focus on strong public pressure for change. 
Increased involvement or awareness of citizens is not an important driver of PFM reform 
(Grant Thornton, 2015). There seems to be a widespread lack of popular engagement 
with PFM reforms, while governments need trust from the society in their fiscal responses 
to crisis. Some developing countries look for engagement with the public on PFM reforms 
(Grant Thornton, 2015): 
o In August 2014, the Indian Government launched the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan 
Yojana (PMJDY), described as the world’s biggest financial inclusion initiative. 
The scheme created 180 million new bank accounts in its first year and is 
expected to improve, not only personal finance practices, but also the efficiency 
of public subsidy and welfare programmes, and ultimately PFM engagement.  
o The Philippines government that has initiated ‘Grassroots Participatory 
Budgeting’ to identify the public goods and social services needed by 
communities. The priorities that emerge inform the budget of the relevant agency. 
In its 2015 national budget, the Philippine government included a total of US$460 
million for projects identified through the Grassroots Participatory Budgeting 
process.  
o A similar mechanism is in place in Kenya, where laws have formally established 
citizen participation opportunities in both budget formulation and approval. Some 
organisations now aim to coordinate this participation. The Institute of Economic 
Affairs, for example, consult with the public across Kenya and publish a 
consolidated ‘Citizen’s Alternative Budget’ to influence the drafting of Kenya’s 
budget policy statement. 
Annex 1. PFM interventions and Covid-19 
Governments around the world have been responding to the current Covid-19 crisis to 
provide massive fiscal support packages to address the adverse impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic on people and firms. Governments are in urgent need to identify fiscal frameworks 
for emergency cash flows during a time of significant market volatility and increasing operational 
risks due to safety and health risks in workplaces. Tools to access liquidity as quickly as possible 
to manage unanticipated cash flows are available, although not for every country under the same 
conditions, such as increased issuance of short-term treasury bills in financial markets, 
contingency credit/repo lines from commercial banks, overdraft facilities from central banks, and 
cash buffers built-up over the past years.  
Conditions for access to such facilities and the management of cash buffers depend heavily on 
good government financial management. Furthermore, beyond seeking access to cash flows 
in a crisis, adequate implementation of fiscal stimulus packages and measuring their 
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efficiency are all in need of well working PFM systems. However, PFM reforms are “not just 
about money: to be successful in addressing a crisis, government policy responses aimed at 
safeguarding people and firms require building public trust, confidence, and support”, write Manal 
Fouad, Gerd Schwartz and Claude Wendling, all working for the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Fiscal Affairs Department, in a recently published post in the IMF PFM blog.7  
The IMF has also published a Special Series on Fiscal Policies to Respond to Covid-19 (next to 
PFM blog post on Covid-19),8 with several publications to share information and good practices.9 
As Sandeep Saxena and Michelle Stone of the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department write in their IMF 
PFM blog post, in general, governments need to ensure that their PFM system is equipped to 
meet the additional requirements and new challenges in terms of:10 
 Delivery of emergency health services, supporting provision of health care to patients, 
the purchase of supplies, equipment, and human resources to monitor, contain and 
mitigate the outbreak of Covid-19. 
 Ongoing delivery of essential services that may come under stress during an outbreak. 
 Supporting new fiscal policies to assist sections of the population in financial hardship.  
 Continued operations despite the absence of PFM staff across government. 
According to Vitor Gaspar, W. Raphael Lam, and Mehdi Raissi, also working for the IMF, there 
are three guiding principles countries should follow:11 
 Target support to households to ensure access to basic goods and services and to a 
decent standard of living. To avoid permanent scarring, target support to viable 
businesses to limit layoffs and bankruptcies. 
 Deploy resources temporarily and efficiently and reflect the costs in multi-year fiscal 
reports.  
 Assess, monitor, and disclose the fiscal risks because not all measures will have an 
immediate effect on deficits and debts. For example, government guarantees extended 
on business loans may have no upfront costs but will fall on the government accounts if 
businesses fail to honour their obligations in the future. 
However, emerging market and developing economies typically have less room in the 
budget to respond. They face multiple shocks: health crisis (high demand for health care and 
related costs), economic crisis (a steep drop in demand from abroad for their goods and 
services, plunging commodity prices), a financial crisis (capital flight, and higher borrowing costs 
in financial markets). Also, they have relatively less developed tax-benefit systems. In such 
a context they design, implement, and monitor their interventions (e.g. stimulus packages). An 
                                                   
7 IMF PFM blog post published on 22 April 2020: https://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2020/04/-do-whatever-it-takes-but-keep-the-
receiptsthe-public-financial-management-challenges-.html  
8 To follow the IMF PFM blog on Covid-19 articles see https://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/useful-pfm-links-other-links.html 
9 See: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/covid19-special-notes  
10 IMF PFM blog post published on 13 March 2020: https://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2020/03/preparing-public-financial-
management-systems-to-meet-covid-19-challenges.html  
11 IMF PFM blog post published on 17 April 2020: https://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2020/04/-fiscal-policies-to-contain-the-
damage-from-covid-19-.html  
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interesting read on these issues could be Mark Miller – from the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) – who recently published an overview of top reads on fiscal responses on Covid-19.12  
In countries like India and Kenya, cash transfers made with the help of unique identification 
systems and digital technologies, or in-kind provision of food and medicine, such as in 
Bangladesh, are options that governments look for to tackle the crisis. China offers temporary tax 
relief for the most-affected people and firms, including in transportation, tourism, and hospitality 
services.13 CABRI has published a Covid-19 Africa Public Finance Response Monitor that 
provides an overview of expected financing gaps and how African governments are responding 
to expenditure reprioritisation, efficiency gains, resource mobilisation, social assistance, business 
support, and monetary and macro-financial policy measures.14  
Annex 2. Short-term fiscal responses to a financial crisis 
Figure 1 shows (based on an ILO et al. 2011 study) that as a percentage of 2008 GDP 
countries in Asia, Pacific, Africa and the Middle East spent the most on fiscal stimulus 
packages as a response to the GFC. Despite the difficulties to determine the exact size of 
stimulus packages,15 data shows that countries in the Asia and the Pacific region (not including 
Japan and Korea) spent 9.1% of their 2008 GDP on stimulus efforts (weighted average by 
country size). China was the main driver of the stimulus spending in Asia as it had a 
stimulus package worth 12.7% of its 2008 GDP (ILO et al., 2011). Khatiwada (2009) also did a 
study on global fiscal stimulus packages as a response to the GFC. The study divides the fiscal 
emergency responses into:  
 Increasing spending on public goods and services (e.g. infrastructure, education, health).  
 Fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers (e.g. personal income tax cuts, cash transfers). 
 Stimulus aimed at firms (e.g. corporate tax cuts). 
                                                   
12 See https://www.odi.org/blogs/16912-public-finance-and-development-top-things-read-fiscal-responses-covid-19  
13 Examples come for Vitor Gaspar, W. Raphael Lam, and Mehdi Raissi IMF PFM blog post published on 17 April 2020: 
https://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2020/04/-fiscal-policies-to-contain-the-damage-from-covid-19-.html 
14 See CABRI website for Public Finance Response Monitor https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/pages/covid-19-public-finance-
monitor  
15 ILO et al. (2011, pp.4-5) state: “It is important to note that there are several issues concerning the economic stimulus 
packages. First, the breakdown of rescue efforts in terms of old spending (already on the pipeline) and new spending is 
uncertain and unclear. Second, the time-horizon in which the stimulus package will be administered is also questionable. […] 
Third, most countries have announced fiscal rescue packages different from their financial rescue packages, but there is a 
tendency to count in financial help to different sectors (like loan guarantees) as part of the fiscal package. […] And fourth, some 
countries have announced stimulus spending embedded in their annual budgets, which makes it difficult in separating new 
spending from the old ones”. 
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Source: ILO et al. (2011), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
inst/documents/publication/wcms_194175.pdf  
Infrastructure projects generally focus on building and repair of roads, bridges, railway lines, 
and rural infrastructure with attention given to projects in the pipeline (e.g. China). China and 
Thailand also announced measures to increase home availability (through public housing 
projects) for poor households, while China and Saudi Arabia have announced significant 
increases in education and health spending with some school and hospital constructions as part 
of rural development programmes. Emerging economies and developing countries fiscal stimulus 
responses after the GFC were largely directed through increased spending on public goods and 
services (ILO et al., 2010; Khatiwada, 2009).  
Tax cuts aimed at consumers fall into two categories: income tax cuts and sales tax cuts such 
as VAT reductions. Countries have also adopted tax cuts to boost sales in certain sectors, such 
as automobiles in Brazil.16 Some countries, mainly high-income countries, but also some higher-
middle-income countries (e.g. Mexico) had special measures to support house owners. China, 
Indonesia, Mexico, and the Philippines, amongst many other countries, announced increases in 
social transfers aimed at poor and low-income households. Social transfers include direct cash 
transfers, conditional cash transfers, and social welfare programmes.17 
In terms of fiscal stimulus aimed at firms, stimulus packages have emphased the viability of 
large firms, especially in the financial and automotive sectors. However, some countries also 
explicitly targeted SMEs (e.g. Mexico, Indonesia). In addition, public investments in 
                                                   
16 In Brazil the reduction in the industrial production tax (IPI) gave an important boost to job creation due to the strong 
employment content – both forward and backward linkages – of the automobile industry. The initiative is estimated to have 
saved up to 60,000 jobs and the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) estimates that each R$1.00 spent on cars 
has a multiplier effect of R$3.76 on aggregate output. (source: ILO et al., 2011.) 
17 ILO et al. (2011) mentions a new social protection scheme in Argentina aiming at bringing children whose parents are 
unemployed or work in the informal sector and as such have not been covered by family allowances. The programme 
consolidates the transfers already provided through different social programmes into one major child benefit programme. When 
the programme achieves universal coverage, the total cost of the non-contributory component would equal about 1% of GDP. 
At the end of 2009 the programme included child benefits to unregistered workers earning less than the minimum wage, the 
unemployed, domestic workers and self-employed workers with very low incomes. In 2009 already 2.7 million children and 
adolescents were registered, about 55% of the total target population. Of these, 1.34 million were not previously receiving any 
social transfer payments (source: ILO et al., 2011). 
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Figure 1. Overview of fiscal stimulus in response to the 2008-09 GFC
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infrastructure, construction and housing provided new market opportunities for SMEs as localised 
projects targeted local providers (e.g. Indonesia). Brazil also introduced special measures to 
support farmers.18  
Social transfers and employment measures (training programmes, job matching, funding 
for employment services) measured as a percentage of the total stimulus spending, is 
often small in developing countries and emerging economies (6.8% for social transfers and 
0.2% employment measures) (Khatiwada, 2009). Mostly the employment element of 
interventions relates to the creation of jobs/income through infrastructure projects. Although small 
in percentage, most employment measures target an extension of unemployment benefits 
(e.g. Chile, Brazil, Turkey, China), for example to more generous systems of unemployment 
benefits for temporarily laid-off workers.19 Other countries like South Korea, the Philippines, and 
Thailand announced country-specific measures to assist vulnerable workers. 
The study by Khatiwada (2009) and ILO et al. (2011) particularly show a clear distinction 
between developed and developing countries. Advanced economies focussed mostly on tax 
cuts while developing and emerging economies focussed on infrastructure spending. The 
fraction of stimulus going into infrastructure spending is three times higher in developing and 
emerging economies compared to that of the advanced economies. Meanwhile, tax cuts 
comprise over one-third of fiscal stimulus in advanced economies, while they comprise only 3% 
in developing and emerging economies, mainly due to the large informal economy that is 
excluded from such measures (Khatiwada, 2009).  
The ILO et al. (2011) study states that Asia’s sharp recovery after the crisis was not only due 
to their financial system being spared as the crisis was mainly economical, but also that it 
owes much to the sizable and effective fiscal stimulus measures implemented by the 
region’s governments. For example, domestic spending has bounced back because the fiscal 
stimulus in the region was bigger and worked faster than in the West. To cite ILO et al. (2011, 
p.18): “Although monetary policy also contributed to the recovery in some countries, fiscal policy 
is likely to have played a greater role since it has a more direct effect on aggregate demand. Tax 
cuts and higher government spending were directed solely toward reviving sagging demand.” 
One important note that the literature makes, in particular, related to South-East Asian recovery, 
is that the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus measures in developing Asia was based on a 
relatively healthy state of government finances as such financial stability allowed 
governments to implement the sizable fiscal expansion after the GFC. For a large part this 
was due to the lessons learned from the Asian Financial Crisis ten years earlier (1997-98) after 
which several, mostly South-East Asian countries changed direction and established PFM 
reforms (e.g. strengthened fiscal rules and control). See later in this report the Indonesia case 
study. Also, the IMF states that developing countries with lower public debt and better budget 
                                                   
18 In Brazil one of the measures aimed to provide direct support to employment was directed towards rural farming – 
representing 16% of the labour force. The Government announced the Plan Safra 2009/2010 that granted R$107.5 billion 
(US$59.4 billion) to 4.1 million rural units, among which R$15 billion (US$8.3 billion) was allocated to family farms. The aim of 
the funding was to address credit constraints, enhance diversification and strengthen insurance against price declines. 
19 For example, ILO et al. (2011) mention for Brazil a number of automatic stabilisers that were reinforced during the crisis. In 
addition to existing social assistance programmes, there was an extension of unemployment insurance benefits by two months 
for redundant workers employed in sectors most affected by the crisis. 
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balances for many years prior to the GFC managed adequately the economic downturn with 
substantial fiscal stimulus packages.20 
In Asia, it was mostly India and the Philippines that had high debt ratios before the GFC. Even 
with some limitations in fiscal space, the Indian government announced three rescue packages 
in 2008 to help the economic recovery – with a total of over 3% of GDP 2009 (Kumar & Soumya, 
2010). These have been largely in the form of a reduction in taxes and duties (across the board 
4% cut in central VAT, aimed at bringing down the prices of both consumers’ as well as 
producers’ goods such as cars, cement, textiles and others) and, to some extent, incentives to 
the export sector (interest subsidy on export finance, a refund of excise duties and central sales 
tax, other export incentives, and a 2% reduction in central excise duties and service tax) (Kumar 
& Soumya, 2010). The main focus was on SMEs and special measures were taken to priority 
sector as the garment industry. The government and Parliament had allowed the fiscal deficit to 
expand beyond the originally targeted levels both in 2008–2009 and in early 2009–2010 to give 
fiscal space to these stimulus packages (Kumar & Soumya, 2010). 
Other countries, like Bangladesh, did mostly the same to support domestic demand (poverty 
alleviation and implement social safety net programmes to increase aggregate demand, plus 
micro credit programmes) and their most strategic export sectors (bonded warehouse facilities 
through which the exporters can import duty-free fabrics and other raw materials; duty draw-back 
facilities which are extended to those who cannot avail bonded warehouse facilities; providing 
5% of the export value to those who use local yarn and fabrics to make their products; and a zero 
tariff on imports of cotton in the interest of yarn producers) (Bangladesh Ministry of Finance, 
2010). In addition to fiscal and financial package the Bangladesh government has taken policy 
support and administrative reform plan which were implemented simultaneously (Bangladesh 
Ministry of Finance, 2010).  
For Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, the situation was different. Like in Asia, the GFC 
had caused a serious economic downturn for most countries on the continent. The global 
financial and economic crisis hit the continent mostly through real channels, such as deteriorated 
terms-of-trade, reduced demand for exports, decline in FDI, remittances, tourism, and possibly 
also aid inflows (Kasekende et al., 2010). As a result, commodity, mineral and oil-exporting 
economies were hit hardest in the region. However, as Kasekende et al. (2010) shows, oil-
exporting countries were also the countries with the highest reserves to respond to the 
GFC. Four years before the crisis (2005 – 2008), African oil exporters posted a substantial 
current account surplus of 11% of GDP and a fiscal surplus of 6.7%. Several countries, such as 
Angola, Botswana and Nigeria used reserves to insulate their economies from the early impact of 
the crisis. In contrast, oil importers recorded current account deficits of 5% of GDP and fiscal 
deficits of 0.6% during that period. Some countries, especially the fragile and post-conflict states, 
lacked the policy space for counter-cyclical measures that could ease recovery (Kasekende et 
al., 2010).  
However, other than Asian governments, most SSA governments face the challenge of 
limited fiscal space to manage fiscal stimulus effectively. Barrell et al. (2009) also suggest 
that a fraction of stimulus efforts in the developed economies would have significantlpositive 
effects in SSA countries if they were implemented in the region. Furthermore, fiscal policies 
                                                   
20 See: Emerging Market Countries and the Crisis: How Have They Coped?, IMF. 2010. 
http://blogimfdirect.imf.org/2010/04/19/emerging-market-countries-and-the-crisis-how-have-they-coped/  
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have not had the same degree of positive effect on job growth as they did on GDP growth 
in SSA (“jobless growth”) (ILO et al., 2011). 
Some examples of African countries that had the fiscal space to seek expansionary policies, are 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Kasekenke et al., 2010).  
 In Kenya, government expenditures in 2009-10 increased by about 25% relative to the 
previous year, while the fiscal deficit (after grants) is reached 6% of GPD. Measures to 
stimulate the economy included a reduction of VAT on electricity, the removal of duties 
on maize and related products, as well as a public works programme.  
 Tanzania’s healthy fiscal space (provided by low public debt and adequate reserves) 
allowed accommodating policies with the highest stimulus package in SSA.21 
Government expenditures on infrastructure (road and energy projects) increased in the 
2009 -10 budget by about 30%. At the same time, the country adopted fiscal measures to 
raise tax revenues, including through widening the tax base and revoking various 
exemptions.  
 In Uganda, past prudent economic policies also provided scope to implement counter-
cyclical fiscal policies, and in particular to raise expenditures in the 2009-10 budget by 
about 20% relative to the previous year. The package aims at supporting infrastructure 
and agriculture.  
 Botswana’s government faced a collapse in exports, which prevented the government 
from considering a major stimulus package. But the government has sustained support of 
the private sector through infrastructure development, paid through build-up reserves. 
 In Mauritius, the government adopted an expansionary budget for the 2008-09 fiscal 
year. The stimulus package amounted to 3.4% of GDP. Most of the expenditures went to 
infrastructure, but also financing education and raising the competitiveness of domestic-
oriented industries and SMEs. In parallel, regulation of domestic prices of gas and oil 
made lower prices possible. 
More generally, most measures mentioned above in SSA also support longer-term growth. 
Furthermore, they are aimed primarily at the supply side and are accompanied by efforts to 
improve the business environment. Infrastructure projects are at the core of the countries’ 
response measures. Such steps are likely to encourage longer-term production and boost 
investor confidence. Second, while some of the packages contain demand measures (reduction 
of VAT rates, for example), these are limited in the African context (ILO et al., 2011; Kasekenke 
et al., 2010).  
                                                   
21 Information from Foresti et al. (2010) PPT titled “The global financial crisis: what role for state capacity and political incentives 
to respond to external economic shocks? Synthesis of literature review findings”. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/dfid-
research-outputs/the-global-financial-crisis-what-role-for-state-capacity-and-political-incentives-to-respond-to-external-
economic-shocks-synthesis-of-literature-review-findings 
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Annex 3. PFM reforms in resource-rich developing 
countries22 
The literature clearly states that governments in resource-rich developing countries, 
particularly with capital constraints, need to be careful not to fall into the trap to over-
consumption and over-investment during periods of economic boom – as this inevitably 
results in a collapse in public spending when resource prices become low. To assure 
stable budgets over a longer period, fiscal policies must challenge short-term and middle-term 
pro-cyclical fiscal policies, boom-bust macroeconomic growth cycles, and sharp exchange rate 
appreciation that make non-resource exports vulnerable. This section of the rapid literature 
review therefore focuses on the efforts resource-rich developing countries take to build fiscal 
frameworks in which they embed their PFM reforms. 
The literature (e.g. OECD, 2018; Ossowski & Halland, 2016) also mentions four policy areas 
that need extra attention: 1) fiscal rules within a clear fiscal policy framework, 2) sovereign 
wealth funds that are embedded within the fiscal policy framework and a macroeconomic 
strategy, 3) transparent and simple to manage expenditure arrangements, and 4) accountable 
oversight bodies.  
The literature on fiscal rules shows that having a fiscal rule on itself is not enough to 
avoid the kind of macroeconomic challenges in times of crisis; it is merely the specific set 
of fiscal rules that are more relevant as based on country-specific needs, institutional 
capacity and exposure to external shocks (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). Therefore, fiscal rules 
should be accompanied by clear fiscal procedures that ensure decisions are accountable at all 
levels. It is often assumed that embedding fiscal rules in law ensures long-term political 
commitment, although Botswana is mentioned as a country with good compliance but without 
permanent fiscal laws (African Natural Resources Center, 2016). The advantage of embedding 
fiscal rules in law is that they become more difficult to alter when there is a change of 
governments. Legislation, particularly constitutional laws, is difficult and costly to amend.  
Research shows that in general most resource-rich developing countries do not comply 
with fiscal rules, and many do not even have them (e.g. Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). 
Countries that comply with fiscal rules such as Botswana and Colombia used a structural or a 
non-resource balance rule that allowed them to continue with some controlled (extra) spending in 
downturn rather than pure budget balance or debt targets (which often result in austerity 
measures). However, as Mihalyi and Fernández (2018) conclude, the institutional capacity, fiscal 
reporting and statistical quality preconditions for adopting structural rules are very demanding. 
Some other information about how countries use their fiscal rules in times of crisis: 
 Only Peru invoked a well-defined escape clause since 2013, rather than modify or break 
its fiscal rule. Although many countries have an escape clause for their fiscal rules, only 
Peru has specific operational guidance on how to activate the escape clause in event of 
a natural disaster or international crisis (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018).  
                                                   
22 Information in this section comes exclusively from the K4D HDR No. 746: Quak, E. (2020). Lessons from resource-rich 
developing countries about using their resource revenues for improved public service delivery. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, 
UK: Institute of Development Studies. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/15145?show=full 
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 In the case of Timor-Leste, the fiscal framework has been put in place with a process of 
adaptation. The Timor-Leste authorities have followed a modified version of this fiscal 
framework, and thus designed the fiscal rule accordingly so that investment can be front-
loaded to address the current development gaps. This process of changing and revising 
the fiscal rule has been accomplished through a consultative and transparent process 
that involved key agents (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). 
 Nigeria has a flat three percent deficit ceiling, which it comfortably achieved in the oil 
boom years. However, the government allowed procyclical increases in spending during 
the resource boom, which in turn resulted in overall balances that did not generate 
significant savings. Ultimately, the government missed the ceiling after the oil price crash 
(Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). 
 Colombia adopted a fiscal rule in 2011 and was able to follow it in the economic 
downturn despite difficult economic times. This is because under its structural budget 
balance rule, Colombia had to adjust much less harshly than if it had an overall balance 
rule: both the structural oil price adjustment and the adjustment for the cyclical position of 
the economy provided additional fiscal room (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). 
 Tanzania provides a good example of non-resource budget balance: the non-gas deficit 
limit is set at 3% of GDP, meaning that any gas revenue above and beyond that level 
needs to be saved for times of poor economic performance or until after gas revenues 
are exhausted (Mihalyi & Fernández, 2018). 
 The fact that Liberia complied with its fiscal rule is unsurprising given how the rule is 
written. Liberia adopted a debt ceiling in 2009, the year before obtaining almost complete 
debt relief. With the debt ceiling set at 60% of GDP, while the country’s debt shrunk to 
30%, the debt rule was clearly too loose to provide any meaningful restrictions on 
government action. However, recent forecasts suggest that the debt limit now is coming 
increasingly close, which will soon put the rule to a more challenging test (Mihalyi & 
Fernández, 2018). 
Overall, the literature shows that fiscal rules should not be too rigid, but flexible within 
clear margins (Mihalyi and Fernández, 2018). Capital scarce resource-rich developing countries 
should also be able to spend more money upfront, but within the confines of clear fiscal rules 
(e.g. Sharma & Strauss, 2013).  
Sovereign wealth funds are becoming increasingly popular tools for managing natural resource 
wealth in developing countries (also called resource funds). Five different funds are mentioned in 
the literature: stabilisation funds, saving funds, finance funds, development funds, and strategic 
investment funds. Such resource funds can support the implementation of sound fiscal 
policies. Therefore, the establishment of a resource fund should be combined with a broader 
fiscal management framework that needs to be coherent, consistent, and disciplined (OECD, 
2018). Implementing countries establish specific operational rules for managing their resource 
funds, covering accumulation, withdrawal, and investment decisions.  
Evidence shows that sovereign wealth funds’ success in resource-rich developing countries 
depends on commitment to fiscal discipline and sound macroeconomic management (e.g. 
diversification strategy, national development plan) (e.g. OECD, 2018; Ossowski & Halland, 
2016). For capital scarce developing countries, stabilisation funds must not be seen as 
supporting capital needs, because their investment policy must highlight safe foreign 
assets to ensure sufficient liquidity to counter price volatility in times of crisis, which can 
result in public criticism. In this respect, transparency is an important tool, not just to report on 
24 
performance, but to build trust among the population that resource revenues are well spent 
(OECD, 2018).  
Saving funds have a longer time horizon inherent (e.g. securing pensions even in times of 
financial and economic crisis) to the policy objective and in principle they afford a lower liquidity 
preference and a greater risk tolerance. Evidence shows that saving funds’ investment 
decision-making shielded from short-term political cycles drives better performance, that 
long-term value creation is contingent on the management of risk and uncertainty, and 
that policymakers should be aware that high-return projects in resource-rich developing 
countries are not immediately available (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). Examples of countries 
that have established resource funds and successfully implemented the operational 
arrangements, at times through a process of adaptation, include Botswana and Chile. Countries 
that have been less successful in implementing resource funds include Chad, Nigeria, 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Algeria.  
The literature is clear to use controlled flexibility within the fiscal and withdrawal rules 
instead of rigid rules to control the funds. The fiscal rules and the fund’s operational rules 
may be mutually inconsistent in certain circumstances, leading to the need for difficult choices 
between compliance and avoiding inefficiency and fiscal costs. Chile’s stabilisation fund is an 
example of a fund where flexible rules have contributed to its successful implementation, while 
Venezuela had poor experiences with resource funds because of changes to the fund’s rules and 
deviations from the intended purpose. 
Key learning points for improved management of resource funds, as mentioned in the literature, 
are an increased transparency, fiscal discipline, and capacity to manage funds. Evidence shows 
that resource-rich developing countries need to integrate the management of the funds 
within broader Public Financial Management (PFM) and Public Investment Management 
(PIM) systems and integrate the funds within the national budget to ensure clarity 
(Venables, 2016; Ossowski & Halland, 2016). Countries with weak institutional capacity and PFM 
and PIM systems should focus on one resource fund, possibly with two separate portfolios to 
meet stabilisation and savings objectives, rather than two separate funds (Sharma & Strauss, 
2013). Some experiences of developing countries by using wealth funds: 
 Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account has played some role in stabilising the economy, but its 
effectiveness has been undermined by the failure of many state governments to ratify the 
federal Fiscal Responsibility Act that set up the fund; by the absence of sound legal 
foundation; and by “ad hoc disbursements”. In 2011, Nigeria established the Nigeria 
Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) as an independent agency to manage the 
country’s new sovereign wealth fund (a saving and stabilisation fund, and investment 
fund) (OECD, 2018). 
 In 2012 the existing Fonds pour les Générations Futures was renamed the Fonds 
Souverain de la République Gabonaise (FSRG), and an agency was created to identify 
long-term investments for the FSRG, which would be a savings fund with investments in 
Gabon. Until the fund’s capital reaches a pre-established minimum level, the fund will 
receive 10% of annual budgeted oil revenues, 50% of the difference (if any) between 
actual total budget revenues and the revenue projection in the budget, and dividends 
from public investments and state participation. Once the minimum capital level is 
reached, the FSRG will receive 25% of the income on its investments, and the difference 
between actual and budgeted oil revenues (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). 
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 Cameroon was initially praised for setting up an offshore (and extra-budgetary) account 
to manage oil revenues, but from which about half of Cameroon’s total oil revenue 
subsequently disappeared. The overall record on stabilisation funds has been poor, with 
multiple episodes of boom and bust (Venables, 2017). 
 Ghana established funds in its Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 and 
deposited some revenues in saving and stabilisation funds. All oil and gas revenues go 
directly to the Petroleum Holding Fund. Part of the revenues is then reinvested in the 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC). Another share is allocated to the Ghana 
Petroleum Funds which serve the dual objective of saving for future generations 
(Heritage Fund) and smoothing the effects of commodity price volatility and sustaining 
public expenditure in periods of revenue shortfalls (Stabilisation Fund). The remaining 
share is channelled to the national budget through the Annual Budget Funding Amount 
and shall serve for spending and investment in priority sectors such as agriculture, 
education, health and infrastructure. But strong fiscal rules governing the small resource 
sector coexisted with lax budget rules elsewhere, allowing government current spending 
to increase dramatically, creating fiscal and external deficits that necessitated an IMF 
rescue programme early in 2015 (Ossowski & Halland, 2016) 
 Trinidad and Tobago is one of the very few Caribbean countries with a natural-
resource-revenue fund. The Heritage and Stabilization Fund (HSF) has well-defined 
objectives, a sound governance structure, and a relatively conservative investment 
portfolio. Nonetheless, inflow and outflows rules are not directly linked to fiscal 
indicator(s) or the sovereign balance sheet. Such rules need to be reassessed and more 
closely linked to a medium-term fiscal framework, improving its potential as a 
countercyclical tool. The fund should be considered within a sovereign asset-liability 
management framework (IMF, 2018). 
Overall, the literature shows that linking the fiscal system with PFM and PIM systems is crucial to 
help avoid the risk that resource revenues are not spent irresponsibly and without consultation 
with relevant stakeholders (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). Establishing a monitoring and 
accountability system that is independent and transparent, focusing on both complying 
with fiscal rules, advising on any changes in such rules, and evaluating the impact and 
quality of public investments, is also crucial.  
Empirical evidence on the usefulness of fiscal councils in developing countries is still sparse 
(Hemming, 2013). However, Mihalyi and Fernández (2018) research shows overall countries 
with national independent oversight bodies are more likely to follow fiscal rules than 
countries with no formal oversight. Colombia, Indonesia and Peru are all examples of 
countries with strong oversight bodies publishing yearly reports on fiscal rule compliance.23 But 
fiscal councils require capacity and strong governance structures, which may be difficult to 
establish, especially in low-income resource exporters (Ossowski & Halland, 2016). 
In cases where there is limited technical capacity but already one established institution 
working on public finance, it may be beneficial to build on it and expand its remit, rather 
                                                   
23 Norway does not have an oversight body for its rule, but the government did task a public expert commission to review 
compliance with the rule. Malaysia has no independent oversight, though it has an internal government body. Botswana and 
Liberia on the other hand have followed their fiscal rules despite not having formal oversight bodies (Mihalyi & Fernández, 
2018).  
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than setting up a new oversight institution (Sharma & Strauss, 2013). Countries also 
increasingly make use of public consultation and building consensus (e.g. Timor-Leste, Ghana) 
for setting expectations around how the natural resource wealth will be managed, particularly 
regarding how much revenue will be available for current consumption and investment, and how 
much will be saved for future generations. 
Annex 4. Indonesia case study  
Indonesia is an interesting case as the country was one of the countries that was worst hit 
by the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The crisis highlighted the lack of efficiency, 
transparency, accountability, and control on state money in Indonesia. Fragmented and 
overlapping structures in the Ministry of Finance were a major constraint, leading to inadequate 
fiscal discipline, poor resource allocation and unreliable fiscal reporting (Ariadharma & Purnomo, 
2018). Indonesia went through a long process of PFM reforms after the AFC and as a result, 
amongst other reasons, was able to react adequate to the GFC in 2008-2009. 
The AFC put the spotlight on the abuse of the PFM system for personal gains of president 
Suharto’s inner circle and the low capacity human resources in the management and use 
of public resources (Ariadharma & Purnomo, 2018). The highly corrupt Suharto regime 
hesitated to modernise Indonesia into an open market economy with strong institutions built on 
improved transparency and anti-corruption measures in a time of shrinking budgetary resources 
due to the crisis and rising public expenditure needs. The result was that the financial crisis 
resulted in the downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, which included the 
collapse of the single-party political system.  
Indonesia engaged with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) longer than any of the 
other countries affected by the AFC. Fund programmes were not terminated until 2003, six 
years and four presidents after their launch in late 1997. The international response on the AFC 
involved the signing of programmes including structural reforms in economy and governance in 
cooperation with the World Bank. As Martinez-Diaz (2006) shows, dealing with different 
presidents in time of turning to democratic rule hampered the engagement with IMF, 
which already suffered from low confidence after the initial contractionary fiscal 
response. Strengthening public sector governance and performance was thus a key imperative 
following the downfall of the regime in 1998. 
Short-term fiscal policy responses to the AFC 
Before the crisis, there was no effective legal framework for budgeting in Indonesia. In 
fact, the process was essentially a continuation of the Dutch colonial budgeting system where the 
preparation of the budget was conducted internally by the Governor-General. The process was 
characterised by a lack of transparency and accountability. In such a context, Indonesia 
signed the Letter of Intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in October 1997. The IMF 
programme for Indonesia was an IMF standard, consisting of the following measures (Nasution, 
2000):  
 a short-term stabilisation policy to reduce domestic absorption;  
 medium-term economy-wide reform to remove economic distortions and improve 
efficiency;  
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 measures to strengthen market infrastructure (e.g., accounting and legal systems) to 
reduce asymmetry of information and transaction costs. 
However, the Suharto regime became soon aware of the real impact of the measures for their 
own businesses and political power and annulled the IMF programme. This was combined with 
the devastating impact of the contractionary fiscal policy and IMF advice to take over private 
sectors debts (bail-out policy). This policy had caused government debt to increase sharply 
and put up additional cost to government budget (Saparini, 2009). The IMF ‘over-managed’ the 
crisis, by demanding fiscal austerity and excessive policy conditionality, in addition to displaying 
a lack of political sensitivity at key periods (Hill, 2012). Consecutive governments, continued with 
the IMF programme after 1998, however, with some relaxation to design short-term stimulus 
packages, and worked on structural reforms with the World Bank. 
Before 1997, the budget deficit had always been financed by foreign financial assistance, 
generally concessionary loans from official sources. Following the crisis, the authorities had to 
find other sources of revenue to finance the budget deficit. These new sources include revenue 
from asset recovery by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), proceeds from the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and flotation of government bonds in the domestic 
market (Nasution, 2000). The model of national assets selling without strategy had caused huge 
loss to the government as the recovery rate of assets was only 20% - far below that of South 
Korea at 47% and Malaysia at 57% (Saparini, 2009). The bank bailouts were financed mainly 
through off-budget mechanisms such as the issuance of recapitalisation bonds, which comprised 
a substantial portion of total public sector debt and entailed significant direct on-budget costs 
(Rosengard, 2004). 
The authorities have also introduced various measures to raise revenue from taxation in the 
direct aftermath of the crisis. These efforts were met with limited successes because the tax 
system in Indonesia was inflexible, inefficient and less progressive (Nasution, 2000). Because of 
high debt, the government of Indonesia also reduced subsidies in the longer-term. Although 
the government has made significant reductions in the level of fuel subsidies in 2001 (and also in 
2002, 2005 and 2008), these reductions were more than offset by rising international fuel prices, 
and the total expenditure on fuel subsidies increased significantly over the years (Blöndal et al., 
2009). 
To help the poor, in the absence of a modern social safety net system, the authorities provided 
food and other basic needs at subsidised prices and created labour-intensive public 
works. However, because of the lack of effective administration at the beginning, the subsidies 
did not reach the needy (Nasution, 2000). At the same time, the subsidies created large wedges 
between domestic and international prices of the state-vended products and provided incentives 
for smuggling to neighbouring countries.  
The government also had to deal with high annual principal repayments and interest of US$9 
billion a year. To ease the pressures on the public budget and the balance of payments, the 
Paris Club creditor nations agreed on 23 September 1998 to reschedule US$4.2 billion in 
principal repayments of Indonesia's public external debt (Saparini, 2009).  
Several policy measures have been taken to improve the governance system and reduce 
transaction costs (e.g. Nasution, 2000; Blöndal et al., 2009; ADB, 2016): 
 Completion of diagnostic studies of the complex government banking arrangements.  
 Formulation of a reform strategy.  
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 Proposals to overhaul the inherited legal framework.  
 Blueprint for Ministry of Finance reorganisation, including creating a DG Treasury. 
 A review of government contracts was initiated to terminate those that were awarded 
through corruption, collusion, and nepotism.  
 Licensing restrictions were reduced to increase domestic competition.  
 The government also discontinued tax, trade, and credit privileges for national car 
and aircraft projects. 
 State-owned enterprises were corporatised and privatised.  
 The accounting and legal systems were strengthened to improve transparency and 
contract enforcement.  
 The bankruptcy code was modernised. 
Longer-term PFM reforms after the AFC: 
PFM reform efforts included amending the constitution, promoting electoral reform, anti-
corruption initiatives, public expenditure and revenue management reforms and 
decentralisation. Many new laws were passed and new regulatory and monitoring institutions, 
required in a democracy and market economy, were established including a powerful Anti-
Corruption Commission (KPK). Such PFM reforms started in 2001 with the establishment of 
the Financial Management Committee initiated by the Ministry of Finance; it comprised leading 
bureaucrats, practitioners, politicians, and academics in Indonesia, and was tasked with guiding 
PFM reforms. A White Paper published in 2002 articulated the need for comprehensive 
PFM reforms covering the full PFM cycle and laid the foundation for enacting various laws to 
modernise the country’s PFM at the central government level.  
The institutional reform phase between 2002 and 2005 included the segregation of roles 
between the finance ministry and line ministries and resulted in clarity on transparency and 
professionalism in public expenditure management. In 2003, Indonesia adopted a fiscal rule 
which caps annual deficits at 3% of GDP and accumulated debt at 60% of GDP. At that 
time, the government’s deficit was 1.7% of GDP and debt was at 57% of GDP, and the economy 
was well on its path to recovery (Blöndal et al., 2009). There was a broad political agreement for 
the fiscal rule, reflecting the consensus that a stable macroeconomy was an essential framework 
condition for sustained growth. A regulation, based on the law, interprets the fiscal rule to 
apply to both the central government and lower levels of government. The new institutional 
structure also including the establishment of a strong DG Treasury and new laws — for 
budget management, planning, and treasury operations — were adopted by a democratically 
elected Parliament (IMF, 2007). The literature mentions the following new legal framework for 
budgeting and public expenses (Blöndal et al., 2009; Ariadharma & Purnomo, 2018): 
 The State Finances Law 17/2003, which detailed the provisions for the budget process, 
mandates clear budget timetables, and established reporting requirements to Parliament, 
and introducing a medium-term expenditure framework system and performance-based 
budgeting. 
 The Presidential decree on Procurement (80/2003) required improvements in the 
procurement regime and provided a timetable for establishing a national policy 
formulation and oversight agency. 
 The National Development Planning System Law (25/2004) provided the legal basis 
for the national development planning process, and for linking planning with budgeting. It 
also set the role of the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS).   
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 The State Treasury Law 1/2004, which outlined the responsibilities of the State 
Treasurer, articulates the creation of revenues and expenditures treasurers in 
government ministries and agencies, together with general principles on the 
management and accountability of public funds. The Treasury Law also envisages only 
one main operational account for government transactions, held at Bank Indonesia, the 
central bank. The objective is to transmit all government revenues into this account by 
the end of each business day and use it for making all government payments, without 
holding noninterest-bearing deposits in other government accounts.24 
 The Regional Governance Law 32/2004, which replaced an earlier law from 1999. It 
outlines the responsibility of regional governments for a range of public services, 
including education, health, public infrastructure, agriculture, industry and trade, 
investment, the environment, land, labour, and transport. 
 The Fiscal Balance Law 33/2004, which replaced an earlier law from 1999. It outlines 
the responsibility of regional governments for managing their public finances, their 
revenue-raising authority and the system of transfers from the national government. 
 The State Accountability and Audit Law 15/2004, which paved the way to more 
accountable and transparent government institutions, obligating each of them to submit a 
financial report to be audited by Supreme Audit Institution (BPK) before being presented 
to the Parliament. The law establishes the operational foundation for the BPK as an 
external auditor to audit the management of and responsibility for state finance. 
The IMF Survey (Lienert, 2007) mentions that during the early implementation phase of these 
laws (between 2005 and 2006) the Indonesian government achieved the adoption of a new 
accounting framework, testing of zero-balance arrangements for treasury-controlled bank 
accounts, and reaching a final agreement on remuneration and placement of idle government 
cash balances. 
Managing such reforms required high-level support and attention, dedicated human 
resources, sustained technical assistance support and a strategy that goes beyond the 
medium term. Having recognised the task of such reforms the Ministry of Finance approached 
development partners, such as the World Bank and international donor countries for support to 
ensure the realisation of the envisioned long-term PFM reform goals. The World Bank supported 
Indonesia with Development Policy Loans, Investment Project Financing, PFM multi-donor trust 
funds, and technical assistance for policy advice (Ariadharma, E. & Purnomo, H., 2018). The 
World Bank also assisted to help sub-national governments to improve transparency, 
accountability and public participation practices (Ariadharma, E. & Purnomo, H., 2018). In 2004, 
the Ministry of Finance signed with the World Bank a package of loan, credit and grant 
agreements for the “Government Financial Management and Revenue Administration 
Project” (GFMRAP). 
Within the GFMRAP it took time for the reforms to take place as building consensus among a 
large group of stakeholders took time. Initially, GFMRAP was planned to include three phases to 
be implemented over 12 years, tackling both public resource management and revenue 
                                                   
24 This had not been the case previously: powerful ministries, such as defense, obtained financing from substantial resources 
off budget. Smaller ministries, including even the ministry of religious affairs, as well as directorates of the MOF, also held 
accounts in commercial banks, outside the main operational account at Bank Indonesia. 
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generation. Phase 1, which comprised the creation and roll-out of a new Integrated 
Financial Management Information System, called SPAN, was envisaged as an integrated 
state treasury and budget preparation system. It was initially scheduled to take 4.5 years, but 
eventually took 11 years, due to delays in procurement and development of the IT software. 
Consequently, Phases II and III, dealing with revenue generation, were dropped halfway through, 
to focus on Phase 1 only (Ariadharma, E. & Purnomo, H., 2018). 
Key achievements of PFM reforms established after the AFC include (Ariadharma, E. & 
Purnomo, H., 2018): 
 Curbing opportunities for corruption by reducing the opportunities for discretion and 
informality that are more common in manual, paper-based systems. A key reform was 
the consolidation of cash balances from thousands of government bank accounts into a 
Treasury Single Account. 
 Improving transparency in payments through electronic transfers to suppliers and 
employees replacing manual checks. 
 Improving the predictability of budget execution and reductions in payment errors. 
Annual budget ceiling data is integrated with SPAN so spending units cannot disburse 
beyond this limit, helping strengthen expenditure control.  
 SPAN greatly improved access to information, allowing not only the senior 
government officials to make better decisions about their program implementation but 
also for the line ministry spending unit staff to see their budget execution progress both 
on-line and in real time.  
 SPAN has benefited the general public through the improvement of the quality of 
audited financial statements to reflect better transparency and accountability of the 
state’s finances. 
In 2007 the Treasury Law was reformed (Lienert, 2007):  
 Conducting a census of all government bank accounts by end-2007. In its annual 
report covering the 2005 annual accounts of government, the external audit office (BKP) 
had found over 6,000 undisclosed accounts. In response, the Minister of Finance is 
taking actions to identify government accounts in commercial banks; ascertain who 
opened the accounts, when, for what purpose, and whether the account should remain 
open.  
 Securing agreement by the Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia (BI) on the principle 
of remunerating excess government funds at the BI. An important objective for BI is to 
avoid the transfer of government deposits to commercial banks, which would increase 
bank liquidity and make monetary management more difficult. 
 Accelerating the deposit of government revenues into the main treasury account and 
reducing lags for making transfers from the main treasury account in BI to DG Treasury's 
commercial bank accounts in its regional offices (KPPNs) (these accounts are used to 
pay suppliers of goods and services to government). 
Besides specific treasury reforms, the government also started in 2007 (before the GFC) to 
implement other budget management reforms, including (ADB, 2016): 
 Taking steps toward introducing a performance-based budget system; 
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 Introducing medium-term budget and expenditure frameworks (in the 2008 annual 
budget, aggregate revenues, expenditures and fiscal targets for 2008-2010 were 
presented for the first time); 
 Identifying the main fiscal risks (a first-ever statement of fiscal risks accompanied the 
2008 annual budget). 
Responses after the GFC 
Hill (2012) states that the fiscal prudence over the period 2000-08 meant that the 
government had re-established fiscal policy credibility and it had some scope for 
expansionary fiscal policies. Hill (2012) and Basri and Rahardja (2011) also show that fiscal 
policy has been remarkably prudent since 2000, with successive administrations able to resist 
demands for greater spending and kept away from budget deficits for most of the time. The only 
down-side mentioned in the literature due to prudent fiscal policies is that Indonesia has 
underinvested in infrastructural projects (Hill, 2012). The reduction in public debt to GDP 
went from over 100% to less than 25% in little over a decade.  This gave the government 
credibility in managing its public debt, and room to move in its fiscal stimulus packages after 
the GFC in late 2008 and early 2009 (Hill, 2012; Basri & Rahardja, 2011).  
The government established a modest stimulus package about 1.4% of GDP in 2009 (Rp71.3 
trillion), considerably smaller than could have been justified by ‘fiscal fundamentals’ (Hill, 2012). 
The two main constraints were a lack of ability to quickly increase spending, particularly on 
infrastructure projects, and a reluctance on the part of the parliament to authorise significant 
increases in expenditure during an election year (Hill, 2012). The package addressed three major 
areas: income tax cuts, tax and import duty waivers, and subsidies and government expenditure 
(Basri & Rahardja, 2011). The government focussed the fiscal stimulus on labour-intensive 
and domestic-oriented projects, aiming at three points (Doraisami, 2011): 
 Sustaining purchasing power to maintain household consumption.  
 Maintaining corporate/business resilience.  
 Creating employment and mitigating the impact of job losses through labour-intensive 
infrastructure construction.  
Aiming to stimulate more household and corporate spending, almost 60% of the 
Indonesian fiscal stimulus was allocated to tax cuts. To minimise the effects of the global 
financial crisis, the government cut personal income tax from 35% to 30% and corporate income 
tax from 30% to 28% (Basri & Rahardja, 2011). The 2009 budget also announced a 15% basic 
salary increase for civil servants, military personnel, police and pensioners, and the 
payment of a 13th month salary. Complementing this was a direct cash transfer paid out to 
18.2 million target households for two months at the rate of Rp100,000 per household per month 
(Doraisami, 2011; Doraisami, 2013). 
In addition, around Rp2.5 trillion was allocated to finance import duty waivers for raw 
materials and capital goods. This was part of the Rp12.3 trillion tax and duty package, 
accounting for 18% of the total stimulus package, meant to support businesses (Basri & 
Rahardja, 2011). To help reduce operational business costs, the stimulus package also included 
diesel and electricity subsidies. Finally, close to Rp12 trillion was allocated to support 
infrastructure and rural sector development (Basri & Rahardja, 2011). To create jobs and 
mitigate job losses the government choose to focus on labour-intensive construction of 
infrastructure. They set up the national community block grant (PNPM) programme to invest 
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in projects in rural and urban areas (Doraisami, 2011). Much of the funding was broken into small 
grants that went to small local contractors and local labourers. To enhance the employment 
outcomes of the infrastructure component, the government has advocated using local 
contractors, labour and resources (ILO et al., 2011). Estimated was that 1 million jobs were 
created due to the stimulus package after the GFC (ILO et al., 2011). 
The Indonesian fiscal stimulus package faced challenges relating to the low number of 
individual and corporate taxpayers (large informal economy), the lack of targeted 
subsidies, and budget execution problems both in general and particularly in relation to 
infrastructure. According to the World Bank (2007), actual budget performance in Indonesia has 
routinely deviated from budget realisation indicators. There is an overall problem with spending, 
and while budgets have become larger, the government has been unable to spend the money 
appropriated. Project implementation is disrupted by an adverse cycle, and in the case of multi-
year projects, it is interrupted at the beginning of each year. This problem has worsened since 
Indonesia pursued decentralisation in 2001.  
Initially the budget deficit was estimated for 2.6% of GDP in 2009, however, in reality the deficit 
was far lower at 0.1% of GDP (Basri & Rahardja, 2011). Indonesia, unlike other East-Asian 
economies is far less export-based and can rely on a large domestic market. For that reason, the 
GFC did not impact severely on the Indonesian market, while residents in commodity exports 
regions were capable of making use of their accumulated savings to fund consumption during the 
GFC. However, Indonesia’s PFM reforms contributed to such a stability that allowed them 
to be in control of the responses (Hill, 2012).  
After the GFC the Indonesian government continued with a countercyclical fiscal policy. It 
also continued with PFM reforms in particular to introduce medium-term expenditure frameworks 
(MTEF) and fiscal risk measures, improve project executions and spending efficiency as 
lessons from the GFC. Line ministries have formulated targets and indicators, which provide a 
better basis for evaluating the performance of programmes and activities in the coming years, 
thus fulfilling a fundamental prerequisite of PBB (ADB, 2016). Targets, and indicators have 
been incorporated in the five-year national plan (RPJM) for 2010–14, and first implemented in 
the FY2011 budget. These are the initial measures adopted in the planning and budgeting 
system in Indonesia in its efforts to shift from “input based system to an output and 
outcome-based system” (ADB, 2016). 
ADB PFM assessment (2016) states further that the government in the aftermath of the GFC has 
created fiscal space via revenue mobilisation and energy subsidy reform to allow for higher 
investment in infrastructure and social welfare programs.  
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